COMMENTS
JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY FOR COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT: A NEW LOOK AT SECTION 101(b)
OF THE COPYRIGHT ACTThe monetary remedy provisions for copyright infringement contained in the Copyright Act have long been a source of confusion and
controversy. Recently, failure of the courts to apply the common
law concept of "joint torts" has even compounded these difficulties.
For although it is generally agreed that all who "unite" in an "act
of infringement" are jointly and severally liable for the "damages"
resulting therefrom,' the act can be and has been read to afford
the copyright owner multiple recoveries for what would appear to be
a single "joint infringement." This conflict arises both from the
fact that the copyright law does not make dear what constitutes an
"act of infringement," and the fact that the remedies provided for
infringement are unique and ambiguous. This comment considers the
applicability of the joint tort concept to copyright infringement
cases in general, and to the damage provisions in particular.
I
The current Copyright Act,2 substantially unchanged since its enactment in 1909, 8 bestows upon the copyright proprietor several "exclut This comment received first prize in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition
at the University of Chicago Law School and is published through the courtesy of
the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers-Ed.
1 This principle was apparently first enunciated in Gross v. Van Dyke Gravure Co.,
230 Fed. 412 (2d Cir. 1916), in which the maker, printer and seller of an infringing
photograph were held jointly liable for the plaintiff's damages. The court said: "Why
all who unite in an infringement are not, under the statute, liable for the damages
sustained by plaintiff, we are unable to see. . . . [A~s all united in infringing, all are
responsible for the damages resulting from infringement." Id. at 414. See also Universal
Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 365-66 (9th Cir. 1947); Sammons v.
Colonial Press, Inc., 126 F.2d 341, 345 (1st Cir. 1942); American Code Co. v. Bensinger,
282 Fed. 829, 834 (2d Cir. 1922); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 86 F. Supp.
399, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), modified, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951), Select Theatres Corp. v.
Ronzoni Macaroni Co., 59 U.S.P.Q. 288, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Harris v. Miller, 50
U.S.P.Q. 306, 625, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); HowEr L, CoPYRiGHr LAw 179 (Latman ed. 1962);
Note, Monetary Recovery for Copyright Infringement, 67 HAv. L. Rav. 1044, 1051-52
(1954).
2 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1958).
3 It is generally agreed that the act is in serious need of revision. As one court
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sive rights" or "monopolies" in his protected work.4 Thus, for example,
he has the exclusive right to "print, reprint, publish, copy and vend
the copyrighted work." 5 The unauthorized interference with any one
of these rights renders the person who interferes liable as an infringer. 6 Thus, one who without authority prints7 or manufactures8
a copyrighted work, without more, is liable as an infringer, as is one
who sells the illicit copy.9 Although the act does not make any such
recently put it, "the inequities and inadequacies of the present law cry out for correction." Miller v. Goody, 139 F. Supp. 176, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (Kaufman, J.). It is
apparent that radical and far-sweeping changes have occurred in the entertainment
and communications industries since 1909, and that an act intended for the problems
of that day can be adapted only with difficulty to cover the problems of today. See
generally Finkelstein, The Copyright Law-A Reappraisal, 104 U. PA. L. Rav. 1025
(1956); Howu.L, op. cit. supra note 1, at 7-8. During the 1950s, a series of 35 studies
was prepared under the supervision of the Copyright Office of the Library of Congress
with a view to considering a general revision of the copyright law. These studies, with
the comments of copyright authorities appended, were published by the Subcommittee
on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
in 1960 under the title Copyright Law Revision [hereinafter cited as Revision]. In
1961, the United States Register of Copyrights offered to Congress his recommendations
for revision. Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S.
Copyright Law, 2 STUms ON CoPYRIGrHT 1199 (Arthur Fisher Mem. ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as Register's Report]. See also Goldberg, Promoting the Progress of Science
and Useful Arts: A Commentary on the Copyright Office Report on General Revision
of the United States Copyright Law, 47 CORNEmL L.Q. 549 (1962). On July 20, 1964, the
Copyright Office's revision bill was introduced into both houses of the Congress and
referred to the respective Judiciary committees. S. 8008, H.R. 11947, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1964). Although introduced too late to be considered more fully in this comment, it should be noted that this bill, in some respects at least, coincides with the
views expressed herein.
4 These rights are essentially negative, or exclusionary rights, in that they give the
copyright owner the power to control and prohibit the use and reproduction of his
copyrighted work. As Mr. Justice Holmes once said: "The right to exclude is not
directed to an object in possession or owned, but is in vacuo, so to speak. It restrains the
spontaneity of men where but for it there would be nothing of any kind to hinder
their doing as they saw fit. It is a prohibition of conduct remote from the persons
or tangibles of the party having the right." White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v.
Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908) (concurring opinion).
5 17 U.S.C. § 1(a) (1958). Section 1 affords numerous other rights to the copyright
owner, including the right "to perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit" and
to dramatize or otherwise adapt it. It also protects, in a somewhat different way, his

exclusive right to have his work mechanically reproduced. See generally text accompanying notes 30-31 infra.
6 No attempt is made here to consider in any greater detail the question of what
constitutes "infringement" or the defenses available in an action for infringement. For
the purposes of this comment, it has been assumed, where relevant, that the fact of
infringement has been established. For discussions of infringement, see HowELL, op.
cit. supra note 1, at ch. 12; NIMMmR, CoPYRGrr, chs. 8, 11-14 (1963).
7 See, e.g., Chappell & Co. v. Costa, 45 F. Supp. 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).

8 See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
9 See, e.g., F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228 (1952).
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distinction, there are two general categories into which infringers may
fall: The original copier, or "primary" infringer; and the "secondary"
infringer, who prints, publishes, sells, or otherwise participates in the
dissemination of the work of the primary infringer. 10 Since it is well
established that "innocence" is no defense to an action for infringement, 11 an infringer who infringes without knowledge or reason to
know that he is doing so is nevertheless liable.
As might be expected, in many cases more than one of the copyright
owner's exclusive rights are violated in what may be termed a single
"infringing transaction." Thus, if A copyrights a book he has just
written, and B, in preparing a book on the same subject, copies therefrom, B is an infringer. If B then sells his manuscript to C, a publisher,
who has it printed by D and sold by E-C, D, and E are also infring10 There are two other, less pervasive, categories into which infringers may fall.
The "vicarious" infringer, as the name implies, is liable as a result of an infringement
by someone for whose actions he is legally responsible. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co.
v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963); Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro,
Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1929); Latman & Tager, Liability of Innocent
Infringers of Copyrights, in Revision, Study No. 25, at 145-46 (1958). The "contributory" infringer is one who aids, induces or contributes to an infringement by another.
Note, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 644, 645 n.6 (1945); see also Latman & Tager, supra at 148.
This latter category has been of limited significance in copyright infringement cases,
although a similar category is important in patent infringement cases. See Comment,
Infringement Under Section 271 (b) of the 1952 Patent Act, 7 ST. Louis U.L.J. 98
(1962); Note, Contributory Infringement: The Tort and its Limitations, 1961 WASH.
U.L.Q. 167.
11 See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., supra note 10; Toksvig v.
Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950); Insurance Press v. Ford Motor Co.,
255 Fed. 896 (2d Cir. 1918); American Press Ass'n v. Daily Story Publishing Co., 120
Fed. 766 (7th Cir. 1902); Comment, 8 Fo"u tAm L. Rxv. 400 (1939). See generally Latman
& Tager, supra note 10. But even though innocence is no defense, courts have often
considered it as a factor in awarding discretionary statutory damages, usually awarding
no more than the statutory minimum against innocent infringers. Sammons v. Larkin,
38 F. Supp. 649 (D. Mass. 1940), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Sammons v.
Colonial Press, Inc., 126 F.2d 341 (1st Cir. 1942); Altman v. New Haven Union Co.,
254 Fed. 113 (D. Conn. 1918); Latman & Tager, supra note 10, at 146. The act contains
limited provisions for the protection of innocent infringers. Section 21 prevents the
recovery of damages from an innocent infringer who has been misled by the accidental
omission of notice by the copyright proprietor, while §§ 1(c) and 101(b) contain special
limits on statutory damages for particular types of innocent infringement. The act does
not expressly define the term "innocent infringer," but for the purposes of this comment an innocent infringer is deemed to be one who invades the rights of the copyright
owner without knowledge or reason to know that he is doing so. Cf. Latman & Tager,
supra note 10, at 155. Although in most cases an innocent infringer will be a secondary
infringer, it is conceivable that a primary infringer can so qualify. E.g., Toksvig v.
Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1950) (reasonable but erroneous belief that
work was in public domain); Insurance Press v. Ford Motor Co., 255 Fed. 896 (2d Cir.
1918) (permission of publisher of work copyrighted by author); Fred Fisher, Inc. v.
Dillingham, 298 Fed. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) ("unconscious" copying by Jerome Kern
of the verse of a song copyrighted by the plaintiff).
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ers. 12 Is each liable to A in an independent action, or are they merely jointly liable? How many different recoveries can A make for these
infringements?
Under generally accepted tort principles, when the acts of two or
more tortfeasors are deemed sufficiently connected or related so as to
constitute a "joint tort," the plaintiff is entitled to a recovery of his
damages from all the tortfeasors jointly, or from any one of them individually. If the plaintiff sues and recovers his full damages from but
one of the tortfeasors, any further action on his part against the others
will be barred thereby. The rationale is that once the plaintiff has
been fully compensated for his loss, any further recovery would be
a windfall.' 3
It is clear that similar problems arise when more than one infringer
has caused the copyright owner's injury. If the joint tort doctrine is
applied, each infringer would be jointly liable for the plaintiff's injuries, and a recovery of full damages from one would preclude a
further recovery of damages from another. If, however, each infringement is considered a separate wrong to the plaintiff, for which
recovery is available, the damage provisions of the Copyright Act
could be read to provide the plaintiff with an award of at least
$250 from each infringer he can bring into court. This is because section 101(b) of the Copyright Act provides that if "any person" shall
infringe a copyright, "such person" shall be liable "to pay to the copyright proprietor such damages as the copyright proprietor may have
suffered due to the infringement, as well as all the profits which the
infringer shall have made from such infringement," or, "in lieu of actual
damages and profits," statutory damages to be no less than $250 nor
more than $5,000.14
12 If B's infringing book were adapted into a motion picture, several more infringers
would become involved. The screen writer, director and producer of the movie would
be infringers, as would the distributors and exhibitors of the production. In fact, in
almost every case it would appear that more than one statutory infringement is necessary for the primary infringement to be at all effective and injurious to the copyright
owner. One obvious exception, of course, is infringement of the exclusive right to
publicly perform for profit the copyrighted work.
13 See Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 413, 418-22 (1987).
14 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1958). The damage provisions have been the subject of considerable discussion. E.g., Broderick, Civil Remedies for the Infringement of Literary
Copyright-A Comparative Study of the Laws of the United States, England and
Canada, 14 U. Drr. L.J. 15 (1950); Caplan, The Measure of Recovery in Actions for the
Infringement of Copyright, 37 MicH. L. REv. 564 (1939); Price, Monetary Remedies
Under the United States Copyright Code, 27 FoIHAm L. Rv. 555 (1959); Note, 37
CONN. B.J. 187 (1963); Note, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1044 (1954); Note, 5 How. L.J. 92 (1959);
Comment, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 385 (1962). In addition to the damage provisions, the
act also provides, in § 116, for a mandatory award of costs and a discretionary award
of attorney's fees.
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Until recent years, the courts have generally applied the joint tort
concept when confronted with two or more infringers whose infringements together caused the plaintiff's injury. 15 In the simplest case,
as where two or more persons combine to infringe the same exclusive
right of the copyright owner (i.e., commit one statutory infringement),
the courts have had little difficulty finding joint infringement and
holding the several infringers jointly liable. 16 But even where different
statutory infringements were combined to injure the plaintiff, the
courts have generally found joint infringement. Typical of such holdings is American Code Co. v. Bensinger,17 where the plaintiff copyright owner joined the publisher, binder, and seller of an infringing
book in an action for an injunction, damages and profits. The court
stated: "The joinder of these parties as defendants proceeds upon the
theory that infringement of a copyright is a tort, and that all persons concerned therein are jointly and severally liable. . . .It is established that one who prints an infringing work is an infringer. . . . So
8
is the publisher . . . .As likewise is the vendor."'
Implicit in such a holding is the feeling that although each defendant has committed his own separate infringement, it was the
combined acts of all that injured the plaintiff and thus constituted
the "act of infringement" to be redressed. 19 However, particularly
within the past decade, several courts appear to have rejected this
view and would seem to hold each infringer severally liable for his
own infringement.2 0 Such results, since they may easily lead to multiple recoveries for the same injury, are questionable.
15 See cases cited in note 1 supra. It should be noted that until recent years this
principle was never tested, since in each case the various infringers were joined in the
same action, and not independently sued. Compare Note, 67 HARV. L. Rxv. 1044, 1051-52
(1954).
16 Reeve Music Co. v. Crest Records, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 272, 276 (E.D.N.Y. 1959); cf.
Ted Browne Music Co. v. Fowler, 290 Fed. 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1923).
17 282 Fed. 829 (2d Cir. 1922).
18 Id. at 834.
19 In Cain v. Universal Pictures Co., 47 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D. Cal. 1942), the infringing
screenwriter of an infringing movie claimed that his liability was several from that
of the movie producers, and that as to him the statute of limitations had run. In
rejecting this contention, and in holding the writer jointly liable with the producers,
the court said: "So the wrong done to the plaintiff in a case of this character does not
lie in the mere copying of his material, which, without publication or incorporation
into a motion picture, would result in no injury to him. It consists of (1) the deliberate
appropriation of a portion of his work and its delivery to others for (2) inclusion in
the finished picture and (3) exhibition to the public." Id. at 1017-18. See also Universal
Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1942); Sammons v. Larkin,
38 F. Supp. 649 (D. Mass. 1940), vacated sub nom. Sammons v. Colonial Press, Inc., 126
F.2d 341 (1st Cir. 1942).
20 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355
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In the leading case of F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts,
Inc.,21 the Supreme Court may well have inadvertently laid the groundwork for such results. Plaintiff was the owner of a copyright in a work
of art entitled "Cocker Spaniel in Show Position," and was in the
business of manufacturing and marketing copies thereof through gift
and art shops. The Lepere Pottery Company manufactured infringing
copies, and sold them to the Sabin Manufacturing Company, which, in
turn, sold them to defendant Woolworth. In this action, the plaintiff sued
Woolworth for its infringing sales, joining neither the manufacturer
nor the distributor. Despite the fact that Woolworth's innocence was
conceded, and its profits established at less than $900, the Court found
that the plaintiff was damaged by the infringement and affirmed an
award of the statutory maximum of $5,000. "Unbeknown to Woolworth, these dogs had been copied from respondent's and by marketing them it became an infringer." 22 The Court made no mention of
the fact that the other infringers were not joined, and by limiting
Woolworth's liability to its infringing sales, it clearly left the door
open to further action against the manufacturer. 23 Assuming that the
plaintiff had been fully compensated in this action for his losses
caused by Woolworth's sales,2 4 further recovery for the same losses
would appear to be unjustified.
In McCulloch v. Zapun Ceramics, Inc.,2 5 such multiple recoveries
U.S. 952 (1958); Maloney v. Stone, 171 F. Supp. 29, 32 (D. Mass. 1959); Greenbie v.
Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); McCulloch v. Zapun Ceramics, Inc., 97 U.S.P.Q.
12 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). In the Greenbie case, in extended dicta, the court correctly observed
that "anyone who violates any of the rights secured by the Copyright Act will be
liable as an infringer" and reasoned therefrom that each infringer should be severally
liable for his own infringement. 151 F. Supp. at 63. In Maloney, the court, in dismissing the action against the infringing printer because the statute of limitations had
passed, expressly stated that the printer could not be liable for the infringing sales
of his "independent customers." 171 F. Supp. at 32.
21

344 U.S. 228 (1952).

22 Id.

at 229.

23 Interestingly, when the case was in the First Circuit, the court stated that the

Sabin Company "had the real financial interest" in the proceedings "because of an
indemnification agreement with the Woolworth Co., and that the latter, although
recognizing its primary liability, if there was any, was 'here simply to watch the
proceedings.'" 193 F.2d 162, 164 (1st Cir. 1951). See text accompanying note 99 infra.
24 In affirming the award of the statutory maximum, the court observed that the
record indicated that "real and substantial injury was inflicted," 344 U.S. at 230, but
that the record was "inadequate to establish an actually sustained amount." Ibid. The
dissent, on the other hand, argued that once the infringer's profits were established,
resort to the statutory damage provisions was not authorized by the statute. The
dissent felt that the award granted "smacks of punitive qualities," and was a "manifestly unjust exaction." Id. at 235, 236. See text accompanying notes 73-75 infra.
25

97 U.S.P.Q. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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were actually sanctioned. Plaintiffs were the copyright owners of two
"works of art in the form of Chinese figurines." The General Porcelain
Company manufactured infringing copies and sold them to the defendants, who sold them to the public. In a previous action, the manufacturer had been found liable to the plaintiff for its infringement. The
defendant sellers in this action claimed that recovery against them was
barred by the previous judgment against the manufacturer, and that
if they were held liable, this would constitute a "double recovery"
for the plaintiff. The court, in rejecting this contention, cited Woolworth and declared that the damages recovered from the manufacturer "are not the same as those sought in this action .. . . If plaintiffs' copyrights are valid, the defendants herein, if they marketed the
copies of the copyrighted figurines, will be infringers ...
and will
... 26
thereby become liable to plaintiffs.
Although the court stated that the damages assessed against the
manufacturer "were assessed as a result of that company's infringement
and not the alleged infringement of any of the defendants in this
present action,"2 7 it is difficult to see how the plaintiffs could have
been damaged at all in the absence of sales of the infringing items.
Thus, any recovery of damages from the manufacturer, assuming that
there were no other sales by sellers not defendants in the second action,
would seem to preclude recovery of the same damages from the sellers
here. And although the court indicated that the damages recovered in
the first action "may be material" 28 in assessing the damages to be
awarded against the sellers, the required minimum statutory award
"in lieu of" actual damages renders the court's holding questionable
at best.
In Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody,29 the defendants were nonmanufacturing sellers of infringing phonograph records.2 0 Under the
"compulsory licensing" provisions of the act, once one record manu26 Id. at 12-13.
27 Id. at 13.
28 Ibid.

29 248 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 952 (1958).
80 Although there is only one real way a phonograph record may infringe a copyright, namely when its manufacturer fails to comply with the royalty requirements,
see text accompanying note 31 infra, such infringement may take three forms. First,
the record may be a legitimate rendition of a copyrighted composition, but an infringement because of the failure of the manufacturer to pay the compulsory royalty;
second, the record may be an "original" rendition of an infringing copy of a copyrighted work; third, the record may be an unauthorized reproduction of a licensed
recording. This latter form, commonly called "disklegging,"-see Comment, 5 STAN. L.
REv. 433 (1953)-was involved in this case. See generally Henn, The Compulsory
License Provisionsof the U.S. Copyright Law, in Revision, Study No. 5 (1956); Blaisdell,
The Economic Aspects of the Compulsory License, in Revision, Study No. 6 (1958).
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facturer is licensed to record a copyrighted composition, any other
manufacturer may similarly record by paying to the copyright owner
a royalty of two cents per record manufactured. Section 101(e) provides that in case of "infringement of such copyright by the unauthorized manufacture, use, or sale" of such records, "the plaintiff shall
be entitled to recover in lieu of profits and damages" a royalty of two
cents per record, and, in the discretion of the court, an additional sum
not to exceed three times the royalty due. 1 The court, also relying
on Woolworth, rejected the defendants' argument that their liability
was joint with that of the manufacturer, and held that "the liability
of each infringer, whether he be manufacturer, distributor or retailer,
is several."3 2 Thus, again, the possibility arises of double recovery for
33
the plaintiff.
Insofar as these decisions allow multiple recoveries for the same
injury, they seem incorrect. The simple good sense of the joint tort
doctrine which prevents the plaintiff from multiplying his recoveries
by suing each tortfeasor separately certainly seems applicable in the
statutory realm of copyright infringement. However, because of the
distinct and technical nature of the statutory remedies for infringement,
a sweeping application of these common law rules to the copyright
cases may not be desirable. The joint tort doctrine must, then, be
examined in relation to each of the three forms of monetary remedy
available: actual damages, infringer's profits, and statutory damages.
31 17 U.S.C. §§ l(e), 101(e) (1958).
32 The court went on: "For § 101(e) dearly defines infringement in the alternative,
viz., 'unauthorized manufacture, use, or sale.' From a normal reading of these words
it would appear that the unauthorized manufacture of a set of 'parts' or records is an
infringement of each copyright and that unauthorized sale of some or all of that set
is a separate infringement. . . . This would mean that the manufacturer and the
seller are each liable as infringers." 248 F.2d at 267. The court did, however, limit
the recovery against the sellers to two cents per record, declaring that the treble
amount provision was only applicable to infringing manufacturers. Id. at 266.
83 In Goody, the infringing manufacturer had settled with the plaintiffs, in which
settlement the plaintiffs expressly reserved all rights against the defendant sellers. 248
F.2d at 266-67. However, in Harms, Inc. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 163 F. Supp. 484
(1958), the court actually sanctioned recovery from sellers in addition to recovery from
the manufacturers. It is submitted that insofar as these decisions hold sellers of
infringing records liable as infringers, they are correct. However, there is no good
reason why the sellers' liability should not be joint with that of the manufacturer.
In this way the copyright owner would have an additional, and most likely a more
solvent, defendant to sue, and yet would not be able to multiply his statutory recovery
by bringing separate actions against the manufacturers, distributors, and sellers. But
see Note, 46 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 621, 625 (1958), in which the possibility of multiple recoveries is defended as a means to better protect copyright owners from the menace of
the record pirates. See also, Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d
804 (2d Cir. 1968); ABC Music Corp. v. Janov, 126 U.S.P.Q. 429 (S.D. Cal. 1960)
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Actual Damages

The first clause of section 101(b) makes the infringer liable for
"such damages as the copyright proprietor may have suffered due to
the infringement." Thus, there is but one basis for such an awardcompensation for injury actually sustained. Such injury may take different forms, depending on the nature of the copyrighted work infringed
and on the nature of the infringement, but the major element of such
injury would seem to be diminution in value of the copyright, most
often represented by lost profits from lost sales. 84 When actual damages
is the remedy sought, it seems dear that the burden should be on the
plaintiff to prove their existence and their proximity to the infringement.
When the acts of several infringers have combined to cause the
plaintiff his actual injury, they should be jointly liable for the resulting damages.8 5 Thus, if but one infringer is sued therefor, and
34 See, e.g., Turner & Dahnken v. Crowley, 252 Fed. 749 (9th Cir. 1918); Gross v.
Van Dyke Gravure Co., 230 Fed. 412 (2d Cir. 1916); Ziegelheim v. Flohr, 119 F. Supp.
824 (E.D.N.Y. 1954); Chils v. Gronland, 41 Fed. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1890). In Paramore v.
Mack Sennett, Inc., 9 F.2d 66 (S.D. Cal. 1925), the damages caused by infringement were
measured by the sale value of plaintiff's scenario before defendant's infringing movie
was released, while in Pickford Corp. v. De Luxe Laboratories, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 118
(S.D. Cal. 1958), the total value of plaintiff's copyrighted movie was deemed the
measure of damages caused by infringement. In Universal Pictures Corp. v. Harold
Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947), an award of $40,000 actual damages was
affirmed on the basis of expert testimony as to the values inherent in the plaintiff's
copyrighted motion picture and the diminution in such value caused by the defendant's
infringement. In addition, actual damages may take the form of additional expenses
caused by the infringement, Atlantic Monthly Co. v. Post Publishing Co., 27 F.2d
556 (D. Mass. 1928), or the loss of publicity to the plaintiff, Stodart v. Mutual Film
Corp., 249 Fed. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), or the loss of contributor's confidence in the
plaintiff's ability to protect contributions from infringement, Atlantic Monthly Co.
v. Post Pub. Co., supra. See generally Strauss, The Damage Provisions of the Copyright Law, in Revision, Study No. 22 (1956); Brown, The Operation of the Damage
Provisions of the Copyright Law: An Exploratory Study, in Revision, Study No. 23
(1958), and works cited in note 14, supra.
85 Of course, if an infringing seller is sued, he should only be jointly liable for the
damages resulting from his infringing sales, since in no way can it be said that he is
jointly liable for the sales of others. In both McCulloch and Goody, several independent sellers were joined as defendants-but it is not clear from the reports how
they were treated in relation to each other. As between separate affiliates of a network
which broadcasts an infringing performance, and as between separate theatres which
show the same infringing movie, the same analysis suggested for sellers should be
followed. Compare Law v. National Broadcasting Co., 51 Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1943);
Select Theatres Corp. v. Ronzoni Macaroni Co., 59 U.S.P.Q. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). In
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963), the defendant
department store was held vicariously liable for the infringing sales of its retailing
concessionaire, who had also manufactured the pirated records. Following Goody, the
court had no difficulty holding the store liable even though the concessionaire had
already been held liable for its infringing manufacture of the records. However, the
court indicated that the problem of joint liability might arise if the plaintiffs should
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full recovery is had, further recovery from another should be precluded. It is incorrect to say, as was said in McCulloch, that the damages recoverable from one "are not the same" as those recoverable
from the other. The manufacture of the infringing items, although
dearly an infringement, could not possibly damage the copyright owner until such items were sold and exposed to the public. If the damages
recovered from the manufacturer were based on the subsequent infringing sales, and it is conceivable that they were, then further recovery
from the sellers was unwarranted.
If the copyright owner learns of the infringing production before
any sales have taken place, then the remedies of injunction 6 and
destruction of the infringing items3 7 are appropriate. Certainly an
award of actual damages should not be made. And this is so even
though the copyright owner has gone to considerable expense to locate, investigate, and prosecute the infringement, since such expense
would not seem to qualify as "damages . . . suffered due to the infringement." However, as will be discussed below, an award of statu38
tory damages might be appropriate.
B. Infringer's Profits
Immediately following its provision for actual damages, section 101(b)
states that the infringer shall be liable "as well" for "all the profits
which [he] shall have made from such infringement." Read literally,
the statute requires that the award of actual damages and infringer's
profits be cumulative; its legislative history, however, requires the opposite. 39 The courts, understandably, have gone both ways,40 but the
also seek recovery for the sales from the concessionaire. Since under traditional tort
and agency doctrine, master and servant are jointly liable for the latter's tort, it
would certainly seem that such further recovery for the same sales would be precluded
here by the finding of liability on the part of the department store.
86 17 U.S.C. § 101(a) (1958).
37 17 U.S.C. § 101(d) (1958).
38 See text accompanying note 88 infra.
39 The House Committee on Patents, in reporting and urging passage of the
current Copyright Act, stated: "The provision that the copyright proprietor may have
such damages as well as the profits which infringer shall have made is substantially
the same provision found in § 4921 of the Revised Statutes relating to remedies for
the infringement of patents. The courts have usually construed that to mean that
the owner of the patent might have one or the other, whichever was the greater.
As such a provision was found both in the trade-mark and patent laws, the committee
felt that it might be properly included in the copyright laws." H.R. REP. No. 2222,
60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909).
40 Cumulative: Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Jobela Fabrics, Inc., 329 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.
1964); Ziegelheim v. Flohr, 119 F. Supp. 324 (E.D.N.Y. 1954); Lundberg v. Welles; 93
F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Sebring Pottery Co. v. Steubenville Pottery Co., 9 F. Supp.
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most recent cases have dearly preferred the cumulative interpretation.
Indeed, in the very recent case of Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Jobela
Fabrics, Inc., 41 the Second Circuit expressly stated that "the 'cumulative' recovery and not the 'alternative' would ... seem to be appropriate under § 101(b)."42
Nevertheless, the cumulative approach raises several serious questions. For while actual damages are awarded to compensate for loss, the
courts rationalize awards of profits in terms of the prevention of unjust enrichment. "The theory was that it was unconscionable for an
infringer to retain a benefit which he had received by the appropriation and use of the plaintiff's property right; and to prevent unjust
enrichment the infringer was treated as a trustee ex maleficio of
his ill gotten gains." 43 Given this theory, it is difficult to justify
the cumulative interpretation. If, for example, the plaintiff's damages
are $1,000 and the infringer's profits $1,500, the cumulative interpretation would require an award of $2,500. However, once the infringer
is held liable for the $1,000, it would seem that he has only been unjustly enriched by the additional $500 he made from the infringement, and
that a total award of $1,500 would prevent any unjust enrichment by
the infringer. 44 A further difficulty with the cumulative interpretation is that in many cases it would result in a double award for the
same infringing sale. Thus, if the plaintiff and defendant are competitors in the same market, and the plaintiff's damages result from lost
sales caused by sales by the infringer, an award of damages and profits
would mean that each sale is counted both as an element of the plaintiff's damages and as an element of the infringer's profits. 45
384 (N.D. Ohio 1934); Atlantic Monthly Co. v. Post Pub. Co., 27 F.2d 556 (D. Mass.
1928). Alternative: Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390 (1940);
Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947); Gordon
v. Weir, Ill F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Mich. 1953).
41 329 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1964).
42 Id. at 196.
43 Sammons v. Colonial Press, Inc., 126 F.2d 341, 345 (Ist Cir. 1942). The court
went on to quote L. P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. Win. Wrigley, Jr., Co., 277 U.S. 97, 99
(1928), a trade mark case: "To call the infringer an agent. or trustee is not to state
a fact but merely to indicate a mode of approach and an imperfect analogy by which
the wrongdoer will be made to hand over the proceeds of his wrong." The award
of profits is an equitable one, and is considered an incident to a decree for an injunction. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 399 (1940).
44 See Note, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1044, 1050 (1954).
45 In Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Jobela Fabrics, Inc., 329 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1964), the
court refused to take the infringer's profits as conclusive evidence of the plaintiff's lost
profits, giving as its reason the fact that "the evidence indicated that the parties sold
fabric of different quality at different prices in what appeared to be a different
market." Id. at 196. The court did state, however, that in some cases such duplication
of sales may be appropriate.
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The "alternative" approach would prevent these anomalies. Under
this approach, the plaintiff would be awarded either his damages or
the infringer's profits, whichever is greater.4 6 A formulation has been
proposed 47 which conforms to the statute's wording and yet retains
the advantages of the alternative approach. Under this scheme, the
damages to be paid the plaintiff would be considered an element of
the infringer's deductible costs in computing his profits. Any remaining sum could then be said to represent unjust enrichment to the
infringer and be awarded to the plaintiff.
A further problem of statutory interpretation was resolved in the
leading case of Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.4

There, the

defendant movie company had incorporated without authority portions of the plaintiff's copyrighted play in a picture it produced. The
plaintiff, relying on some earlier copyright cases,4 9 claimed "all the
profits" made from the infringing production, and contended that the
apportionment declared by the Second Circuit 0 was contrary to the
language and intent of the statute. The Supreme Court rejected this
contention as "untenable," 51 and after reviewing the equitable nature
of the recovery of profits and the established rule of apportionment of
profits in patent infringement cases, stated: "When such an apportionment has been fairly made, the copyright proprietor receives all the
profits which have been gained through the use of the infringing ma52
terial and that is all that the statute authorizes and equity sanctions."
Thus the infringer whose book or movie is partially original and partially copied is only liable for the profits which may fairly be said to
53
have been derived from the infringement.
46 Significantly, the Register's recommendation for revision provides that "[a]n infringer is liable for the actual damages suffered by the copyright owner, or the profits
of the infringer attributable to the infringement, whichever is greater." Register's
Report 107.
47 See Nniim, COPYRIGHT § 151 (1963), citing Note, 67 HARv. L. Rr.v. 1044, 1051
(1954).
48 309 U.S. 390 (1940), affirming, 106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1939).
49 Belford v. Scribner, 144 U.S. 488 (1892); Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888);
Dam v. Kirk La Shelle Co., 175 Fed. 902 (1910).
GOThat court, per L. Hand, J., observed that the success of the defendant's production was in large part the result of factors unrelated to the fact of infringement, and
remarked: "We will not accept the experts' testimony at its face value; we must make
an award which by no possibility shall be too small. It is not our best guess that must
prevail, but a figure which will favor the plaintiffs in every reasonable chance of error.
With this in mind we fix their share of the net profits at one fifth." 106 F.2d 45, 51
(2d Cir. 1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 290 (1940). The district court had awarded the plaintiff
"all the profits" made by the defendant from the motion picture. 26 F. Supp. 134
(S.D.N.Y. 1938).
51 309 U.S. 390, 398 (1940).
52 Id. at 406.
53 Accord, Orgel v. Clark Boardman Co., 301 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1962); Universal Pic-
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In the Sheldon case, the plaintiff was awarded one-fifth of the profits
made by the defendants from the motion picture. And this award, it
has been observed, was "far more than the probable commercial value
of his play." 54 Nevertheless, following his initial success against the
producers, the plaintiff instituted a second action, this time against
New York's Capitol Theater for the profits it made from exhibition
of the movie. And in Sheldon v. Moredall Realty Corp.,5 5 the plaintiff was awarded one-fifth of those profits. The court, although recogniz56
ing that the exhibitor was "unquestionably an innocent infringer,"
considered itself bound by the apportionment announced in the original
57
case.
This award, although arguably sanctioned by the language of the
statute, seems totally unwarranted. Not only does it provide the plaintiff with one obvious windfall, it also allows him to proceed against
every other exhibitor of the film for the profits made from their exhibitions. Even more important, such awards seem to divest innocent
infringers of profits they would have made whether or not the film
exhibited was in fact an infringement. Indeed, it is doubtful that
these exhibitors would have made one-fifth less profits if the film exhibited had been completely original, or if they had exhibited a different
film instead.
Such questionable results could be prevented if the courts followed
the logic of the apportionment rule to its conclusion. That is, if an
infringer is only liable for the profits "attributable" to the infringement, he should therefore be liable only for the profits made that
would not have been made but for the fact that he infringed. If the
purpose of the profits provision is to remove any gain from infringement, such a rule would be adequate to that end. By allowing the
infringer to deduct his opportunity costs, or profits he would have
made from handling a non-infringing item, the courts could still
prevent unjust enrichment by the infringer and at the same time prevent the copyright owner from recovering more than he deserves.
Under such a rule, the profits, of a primary infringer, like the protures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947); Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp. v. Stonesifer, 140 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1944); Harris v. Miller, 57 U.S.P.Q.
103 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); cf. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 399
(S.D.N.Y. 1949), modified, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951). See generally, NimMER, Cor'PRIGHT
§ 153.3 (1963).
54 Brown, The Operation of the Damage Provisions of the Copyright Law: An
Exploratory Study, in Revision, Study No. 23, at 72 (1958).
55 29 F. Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
56 Id. at 730.
57 Id. at 731.
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ducers in Sheldon, would still be awarded to the copyright owner. But
it is questionable whether the profits of innocent secondary infringers
could still be recovered. In the case of an innocent printer, distributor,
seller or exhibitor who handled the infringing work in the ordinary
course of his respective business, it would seem that any "profits" derived from his infringing act are more accurately attributable to his
business and not to the fact of infringement. Assuming normal commercial bargaining between the primary and secondary infringers, if
the fact of infringement enhanced the value of the infringing work at
all, it seems probable that that increment of value (i.e., "profits"
resulting from the fact of infringement) will inure to the primary infringer and not to the secondary infringer who was ignorant of the
fact of infringement. 58 Thus, only if the presence of the infringement
on the market increased the over-all demand for the secondary infringer's services can it realistically be argued that he has profits
attributable to the fact of his infringement. As a practical matter
such profits would appear to be so insubstantial and indirect that
their recovery would be difficult to justify even if their existence could
be proved.5 9
The courts have not reached this result because they have applied
strict accounting principles in determining the profits derived, not
from the fact of infringement, but from the infringing act. At present,
the infringer's opportunity costs are non-deductible. 60 Although courts
would be able to reach the results demanded by the proposed analysis
by interpreting the language of the statute ("profits . . .made from such
58 Of course, if the secondary infringer knew of the infringement and as a result
was able to obtain the infringing item or items at a lower cost (or, as in the case
of a printer, charge more for his services), then that increment of profit is clearly
attributable to the infringement.
59 In Orgel v. Clark Boardman Co., 128 U.S.P.Q. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), modified on
other grounds, 301 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1962), the plaintiff, author of a copyrighted legal
treatise, sought the profits of the infringing author which allegedly had been derived
from increased income from his law practice resulting from his infringement. The
court refused to make such an award, declaring that "the subject is too remote and
speculative to be susceptible of computation by a court." Id. at 532.
60 The infringer may deduct the direct costs of the infringing items sold (but not
for all those produced), Alfred Bell &Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 399
(S.D.N.Y. 1949), modified, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951); a reasonable allocation of overhead used to produce the items, ibid.; and, if the infringer is innocent, his income
taxes paid on the profits derived from infringement. Compare Sheldon v. MetroGoldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 390 (1940) with
Sheldon v. Moredall Realty Corp., 29 F. Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). In Sheldon v. Metro
Goldwyn Pictures Corp., however, the court refused to grant the defendants a credit
for their standing and reputation in the industry: "It follows that they can be credited
only with such factors as they bought and paid for; the actors, the scenery, the producers, the directors and the general overhead." 106 F.2d at 51. See generally NIMRa,
CoPyRiGHT § 153.2 (1963); Note, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1044, 1048 (1954).
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infringement") to refer to profits derived because the items handled
were in fact infringements, such a development seems unlikely in view
of the present mature but unreasoned state of the case law. 1' As a
matter of statutory drafting the problem could be met by the use of a
"but for" rule (i.e., profits that would not have been made but for the
fact of infringement), and by further providing that no profits can be
recovered from innocent secondary infringers. While this second rule
might insulate the profits of a few infringers even though those profits
would qualify under the "but for" test, it would appear to be justified
because of the simplicity it would provide. As to primary and non-innocent infringers, the present act's allocation of the burden of proof
could be retained, 62 placing the burden on the infringer to show deductible costs (including opportunity costs) once the copyright owner
has proved the amount of gross revenue63 derived from the infringing
act. Since rules governing the burden of persuasion are likely to be
as crucial if not more crucial than substantive rules in this area, such
an allocation would ensure that all the profits of primary and noninnocent infringers attributable to the infringement would be recovered.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that infringing sales may well
be one of the best indications of the plaintiff's actual damages. But
if the infringer's profits are used as a measure of the plaintiff's actual
damages, they should be awarded as such and not under the infringer's
profits provision of the statute.
As for joint liability, it appears to be well settled that a joint infringer is liable only for the profits made by him from his infringement,
and not for the profits of other joint infringers involved. 64 This is,
61 But see Gordon v. Weir, 111 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Mich. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 216
F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1954). In that case the primary infringer appropriated the plaintiff's
"Count the Dots" contest and licensed various retailers to use this contest in advertisements. On the question of the infringing retailers' liability, the court said: "There must
be some point at which an innocent infringer should be protected from liability other
than an accounting of profits which he would not have made but for use of such copyrighted matter. In other words, equity under such circumstances would require that
he need not respond in damages unless he made a' profit which he would not have
otherwise made." Id. at 124. See also Note, 72 HARv. L. Rav. 328, 346 (1958).
62 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1958): "and in proving profits the plaintiff shall be required
to prove sales only, and the defendant shall be required to prove every element of
cost which he claims .... "
03 Although the act refers to "sales," the courts have generally interpreted this to
mean gross revenue. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45 (2d
Cir. 1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 390 (1940). The Register has proposed that the revised act
refer to "gross revenue." Register's Report 102.
64 Sammons v. Colonial Press, Inc., 126 F.2d 341, 345 (1st Cir. 1942): "The presupposition is that the infringer has gotten something which it is unconscionable for him
to keep; and hence it logically follows that the infringer is accountable only for the
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of course, in accord with the "unjust enrichment" rationale of the
statutory provision. An infringer is only enriched by the profits he has
received, and thus his liability for profits should always be several,
and not joint.
C. Statutory Damages
"In lieu of actual damages and profits," section 101(b) provides for
an award of "such damages as to the court shall appear to be just."
This unique provision for "statutory damages" is probably both the
most effective means of protecting the copyright owner's statutory
rights, and, at the same time, the fundamental cause of the considerable confusion and controversy surrounding enforcement of the act.
With a few narrow exceptions, such awards are to be not less than
5250 nor more than $5,000,65 and the court's discretion in assessing
such damages between these limits is non-reviewable. 66
Statutory damages are awarded today to a "significant extent," 67
but in doing so the courts have not followed or developed any meaningful standard to guide the exercise of their discretion. Since Woolworth, it is dear that statutory damages may be granted even though
the infringer's profits are established, but it is still not clear whether
they are justified if both damages and profits are shown. 68 Furthermore, most courts will award at least the statutory minimum even
profits he received, not for the profits which may have been received by a co-infringer."
See also Washingtonian Pub. Co. v. Pearson, 140 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Alfred
Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), modified, 191
F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
65 There is disagreement as to whether the existing minimum and maximum should
be retained or altered in a revised act. See comments appended to Strauss, The Damage
Provisions of the Copyright Law, in Revision, Study No. 22 (1956). The Register would
retain the present $250 minimum but increase the maximum to $10,000. Register's
Report 106-07.
66 Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U.S. 207 (1935).
67 Brown, The Operation of the Damage Provisions of the Copyright Law: An
Exploratory Study, in Revision, Study No. 23, at 69 (1958).
68 The Woolworth Court apparently sanctioned an award of statutory damages
even though both damages and profits are proved when it concluded that "the statute
empowers the trial court in its sound exercise of judicial discretion to determine
whether on all the facts a recovery upon proven profits and damages or one estimated
within the statutory limits is more just." 344 U.S. 228, at 234. However, earlier in the
opinion the Court stated: "Lack of adequate proof on either element would warrant
resort to the statute in the discretion of the court, subject always to the statutory
limitations." Id. at 233. (Emphasis added.) Once the amount of the plaintiff's actual
damages has been established, assuming it is more than the statutory minimum, any
higher award of statutory damages resembles the penalty such awards are not supposed
to be. If the plaintiff's actual damages are less than $250, however, and if the infringer
were not innocent, then an award of $250 would be proper.
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in the absence of any showing of injury or profits,
although some
courts have required some showing of actual injury.70
The most helpful guide to a construction of the statutory damages
provision is the Supreme Court's opinion in Douglas v. Cunningham:71
The phraseology of the section was adopted to avoid the
strictness of construction incident to a law imposing penalties, and to give the owner of a copyright some recompense
for injury done him, in a case where the rules of- law render
difficult or impossible proof of damages or discovery of profits. In this respect the old law was unsatisfactory. In many
cases plaintiffs, though proving infringement, were able to
recover only nominal damages, in spite of the fact that preparation and trial of the case imposed substantial expense and
inconvenience. The ineffectiveness of the remedy encouraged
72
willful and deliberate infringement.
This quotation suggests two separate grounds upon which an award
of statutory damages might be justified. First, statutory damages may
be awarded to deter infringement and to help cover the costs of policing and preventing infringement in cases where actual damages or
profits are nominal or non-existent; and secondly, to provide adequate
compensation where the actual injury sustained by the copyright owner
is difficult or impossible to value accurately.
Although section 101(b) expressly states that awards made under it
"shall not be regarded as a penalty," presumably meaning that the
amount of the award should not vary with the culpability of the infringer, it is dear that statutory damages have in fact been awarded
in an attempt to penalize infringers. 73 On the other hand, many courts,
69 See Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co. v. Buck, 283 U.S. 202 (1931); Sammons v. Colonial
Press, Inc., 126 F.2d 341 (1st Cir. 1942); Johns & Johns Printing Co. v. Paull-Pioneer
Music Corp., 102 F.2d 282 (8th Cir. 1939); Chappell & Co. v. Costa, 45 F. Supp. 554
(S.D.N.Y. 1942); Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 Fed. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); Altman
v. New Haven Union Co., 254 Fed. 113 (D. Conn. 1918).
70 See Washingtonian Pub. Co. v. Pearson, 140 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Rudolf
Lesch Fine Arts, Inc. v. Metal, 51 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Norm Co. v. John A.
Brown Co., 26 F. Supp. 707 (W.D. Okla. 1939); Sebring Pottery Co. v. Steubenville
Pottery Co., 9 F. Supp. 884 (N.D. Ohio 1934); Woodman v. Lydiard-Peterson Co., 192
Fed. 67 (D. Minn. 1912), aft'd, 204 Fed. 921 (8th Cir. 1913).
71 294 U.S. 207 (1935).
72 Id. at 209.
73 In Warren v. White & Wyckoff Mfg. Co., 39 F.2d 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1930), the court
found that the defendant had infringed a copyright of the plaintiff in a promotional
calendar it distributed, but observed that the plaintiff was not, nor could he have been,
injured by the infringement. The court continued: "[W]ere it not for the fact of the
deliberate, unacknowledged, appropriation of material from plaintiff's book, I should
be inclined to treat the whole matter as a tempest in a teapot, and, while finding for
plaintiff for the minimum statutory damages, let him have his trouble for his .pains.
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when confronted with innocent, non-injurious infringements, have
understandably hesitated in awarding even the statutory minimum on
the grounds that such an award would constitute an unwarranted
penalty.7 4 In view of the compensatory nature of the damage provisions, as well as the statute's provisions for criminal sanctions for willful infringement for profit, 75 it would seem that statutory damages

should not be so applied.
There are, however, valid reasons in many cases for an award of
the statutory minimum even though the plaintiff's injuries and the
defendant's profits are nominal. Most conspicuously in the area of
exclusive performing rights, infringements are often extremely difficult
and expensive to detect.1 6 Although each separate infringement is unlikely to produce more than nominal damages, such infringements in
the aggregate may be highly damaging to the copyright proprietor. Furthermore, in most cases of infringement of the performing right, the
infringer is unlikely to qualify as "innocent," and hence non-deterrable,
77
because of the existence of highly publicized licensing associations.
Without the guaranteed minimum award, many copyright owners would
be less able effectively to police and enforce their rights. The guaranAs a result of this unaccountable and inexcusable copying, plaintiff has found it necessary to institute this suit to bring the defendant to book, and it seems to me that,
the defendant having led the plaintiff a dance over the matter, it, and not the plaintiff,
ought to be made to pay the fiddlers and the scot." Id. at 923. The court granted
the plaintiff $1,000 in statutory damages, plus all costs and $1,000 as attorney's fees.
See also Amplex Mfg. Co. v. A.B.C. Plastic Fabricators, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 285 (E.D.
Pa. 1960).
74 See, e.g., M. Witmark & Sons v. Calloway, 22 F.2d 412 (E.D. Tenn. 1927); Fred
Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 Fed. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); Altman v. New Haven Union
Co., 254 Fed. 113 (D. Conn. 1918); cf. Barry v. Hughes, 103 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1939)
(dicta).
75 17 U.S.C. § 104 (1958). See generally Strauss, Remedies Other Than Damages For
Copyright Infringement, in Revision, Study No. 24, at 124-27 (1959).
78 See Finkelstein, Public Performance Rights in Music and Performance Rights
Societies, SzvxrN COPYRIGHT PROBLEMs ANALYZED 69 (1952).
77 There are currently three major associations, of which the largest is the American
Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP). Users of copyrighted music-

including hotels, nightclubs, restaurants, theaters, motion pictures, radio and television
stations, ice-skating rinks, etc., are licensed by these associations on either blanket or
per program bases, with the license fees varied according to the nature of the user's
business, its audience, income, etc. See Finkelstein, Public Performance Rights in Music
and Performance Rights Societies, SEVEN COPYRIGHT PROBLEMS ANALYZED 69 (1952);
Finkelstein, The Composer and The Public Interest-Regulation of Performing Right
Societies, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 255 (1954); Brown, The Operation of the Damage
Provisions of the Copyright Law: An Exploratory Study, in Revision, Study No. 23,
at 90-92 (1958); cf. II WARNER, RADIO AND TELEvIsION LAW 663 (1953): "The minimum
damage clause has been used on more than one occasion by the various performing
rights societies as an effective club to compel consumers to take out music licenses."
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teed award serves to deter potential infringers, and, at the same time,
ease the burden of enforcement for copyright owners.
Such reasoning does not, however, justify an award of the statutory
minimum in every case of infringement. When innocent infringers
are sued, a guaranteed minimum award could well result in an unwarranted windfall to the plaintiff without any corresponding deterrent effect on the infringer. Because the securing of a certificate of
copyright registration from the copyright office does not guarantee
the validity of a claimed copyright, it is virtually impossible for a
printer, distributor or seller to determine whether items he obtains
in the normal course of business are in fact infringements. In a very
real sense, he is at the mercy of the good faith of the source from whom
he receives the items. 78 In such cases, in the absence of actual injury,
there is no justification for any award at all. Any revision of the Copyright Act should remove the present statutory command for an award
of the statutory minimum against all infringers. 79
But an award of statutory damages in excess of the minimum should
only be made when required to compensate for actual injuries sustained. To vary the amount of such awards solely because of the
culpability of the infringer-as was apparently sanctioned in a dictum
in Woolworth- 8 0 runs counter to the non-penal policy of the statute.
In the quotation from Douglas above, the Court pointed out that in
addition to deterrence a second justification for an award of statutory
damages existed "where the rules of law render difficult or impossible
proof of damages or discovery of profits." In many cases, it is readily
conceivable that the plaintiff's actual injury meets this test. In the
case of a copyrighted catalogue or advertisement, for example, accurate
valuation of the damages caused by infringement may often be impossible, or at least extremely difficult and expensive.81 However, in
78 During the hearings preceding the 1909 Act, George W. Ogilvie, a Chicago publisher, testified: "There is no printer in the United States whom I cannot get in trouble
-serious trouble-so serious that it might put him out of business. I take to him
a set of plates about which he knows nothing as to the existence of copyright on them.
He prints them for me . . . and then the owners of the copyright can get after him
and collect damages ...." Quoted in Latman & Tager, Liability of Innocent Infringers
of Copyrights, in Revision, Study No. 25, at 145 (1958). The existence of an indemnification agreement, however, would mollify this harshness. See text accompanying
note 99 infra.
79 It was recommended in the Register's Report that "if the defendant proves that
he did not know and had no reason to suspect that he was infringing, the court may,
in its discretion, withhold statutory damages or award less than $250." Register's

Report 107.
80 "Even for uninjurious and unprofitable invasions of copyright the court may,
if it deems it just, impose a liability within statutory limits to sanction and vindicate
the statutory policy." 344 U.S. 228, 233.
81 See, e.g., Markham v. A.E. Borden Co., 221 F.2d 586 (Ist Cir. 1955) (infringement
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many cases it appears that statutory damages are awarded without any
showing of the existence of actual injury or that the amount of the
82
damages is difficult or impossible to prove.
In the recent Peter Pan case, in which the court refused to take the
infringer's profits as conclusive evidence of the plaintiff's damages
from lost profits, the court ruled that it was error for the trial court
not to consider an award of statutory damages in addition to the
award of profits. Yet the court also observed that there was no finding
below of any injury to the plaintiffs and that they "professed their
inability to prove sales lost due to the infringement, declining to offer
'evidence of supposition, opinions and all that business.' "83 This failure of proof of the existence of injury suggests either that there was
none, or that the plaintiffs were willing to settle for an award of statutory damages within the prescribed limits. But in the absence of proof
of the fact of injury sustained, such an award appears unwarranted;
although the court followed the language of Woolworth, it apparently
failed to notice that there the fact of actual injury to the plaintiff
was established.8 4 Moreover, if the Douglas test of "difficulty of proof"
is applied, this case would not seem to qualify. While the amount of
such injury might be difficult to prove, it would seem that the fact of
sales lost could easily be established. And as to the amount of such
damages, it has been observed that "the trend in damage law in recent decades has been to relax the requirements of exactness. Once the
fact of damage has been established, some freedom is left to the trier
to estimate the amount." 85 Moreover, "if the case is one of considerable
magnitude, in dollar terms, the plaintiff appears to be more likely to
aim for, and if successful, to get actual damages or profits." 86
Thus the remedy of statutory damages is attractive to those whose
of refrigeration and air conditioning catalogues); Wells v. American Bureau of
Engineering, Inc., 285 Fed. 371 (7th Cir. 1922) (infringement of drawings of automobile
ignition systems); Advertisers Exchange, Inc. v. Hinckley, 101 F. Supp. 801 (W.D. Mo.
1951), affd, 199 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1952) (infringement of collections of advertisements);
Cory v. Physical Culture Hotel, 14 F. Supp. 977 (W.D.N.Y. 1936), afl'd, 88 F.2d 411

(2d Cir. 1937) (infringement of aerial photographs of hotel). In the Woolworth case
the district court's award of the statutory maximum was based, at least in part, on
the following finding: "It is natural for dealers to think that the plaintiff is making
and selling a cheaper reproduction of inferior quality through the Woolworth Company at a much lower price, and to refuse to do business with the plaintiff." 93 F.
Supp. 739, 745 (D. Mass. 1950).
82 See note 69 supra.
83 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Jobela Fabrics, Inc., 329 F.2d 194, 195 (2d Cir. 1964).
84 See note 24 supra.
85 Brown, The Operation of the Damage Provisions of the Copyright Law: An
Exploratory Study, in Revision, Study No. 23, at 69 (1958).
86 Id. at 83.
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actual damages are substantially less than the statutory maximum. This
appears to be what happened in Peter Pan, where the plaintiff seems
to have tried to use his inability to show actual damages as a justification for an award of statutory damages. Counsel should not be permitted to increase the size of the copyright owner's recovery by professing unwillingness to carry their burden of proof. Statutory damages
are to be awarded "in lieu of" actual damages, and it seems reasonable to require that the plaintiff prove the existence of injury and the
difficulty of proving the amount thereof before he is awarded statutory
87
damages.
Applying the joint tort concept to awards of statutory damages,
problems of multiple recoveries arise when only one infringer is sued.
If the primary infringer is brought into court, as he should be, the
plaintiff should be entitled to a full recovery of his actual or statutory
damages. Such recovery should bar any further action against other joint
infringers, except for the profits of any other non-innocent infringer
involved. If, however, an innocent infringer is sued, he should be liable
only for the plaintiff's damages, either "actual" or statutory, but no
award of the statutory minimum should be made for deterrence purposes alone. In a case where the joint infringement has not yet been
completed, for instance where the infringing sales have not yet been
made, an award of the statutory minimum should be made (along with
an injunction and destruction of the infringing items) only if justified
8s
for purposes of deterrence
II
In order to prevent multiple recoveries for the same injury, the joint
tort concept should be applied to awards of damages in copyright infringement cases. But once this proposition is accepted, further difficul87 In Sebring Pottery Co. v. Steubenville Pottery Co., 9 F. Supp. 384, 387 (N.D.
Ohio 1934), the court stated: "In providing for recovery of a sum within the prescribed
limits, in lieu of actual damages, Congress recognized the character of the actual
damage done and provides [sic] that when actual damages are proven which cannot
be measured in dollars and cents, then the court may, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, award a sum within the maximum and minimum limits. That is, this
law obviates the strict necessity of proving the exact amount of damage without
negativing the necessity of proof of some real damage done."
8 In cases where the infringement is by means of mechanical reproduction, the
statutory damage remedy is somewhat different from the general provisions for
recovery. However, analytically, the effect is the same. The purpose of the statutory
royaltyas well as the provision for "treble damages," is dearly intended to compensate
the plaintiff for losses caused by infringement and to deter potential infringers. Since
these royalty payments are "in lieu of profits and damages," it would seem that whatever rules apply for joint liability for statutory damages should also apply to statutory
royalties.
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ties are presented. Throughout the preceding discussion it has been
assumed that the plaintiff's injury was jointly caused by the various
infringers. However, as in the general tort area, it may often be
quite difficult to determine when the acts of several infringers consti'tute a "joint infringement." The statute, written in terms of "any person" and "the infringement," is of little aid in determining whether
several statutory infringements should be considered joint or independent. Moreover, the inconsistency of the common law tests for joint
torts render them of limited utility.8 9 It would seem that such a determination cannot be made on the basis of any hard and fast rule,
and that, in the end, such a conclusion must be based on a reasonable
examination of the facts of the particular case. As Dean Prosser once
observed, "a tort is 'joint,' in the sense which the American courts have
given to the word, when no logical basis can be found for apportionment of the damages between the defendants."9 0
Thus, in cases like Woolworth, McCulloch, and Goody, as well as
that of A's book, it seems apparent that the various infringements constituted but one "joint infringement" for which monetary remedy
should be available. However, cases like Altman v. New Haven Union
Co., 91 require a different result. In that case the plaintiff, a photographer, brought suit against the defendant newspaper for its infringing
publication of a copyrighted photograph. Prior to this action the plaintiff sued, and settled with, an engraver and printer who had infringed
his copyright by reproducing and distributing the photograph without
his authorization. The defendant newspaper in this case claimed that
its liability was joint with that of the former defendants, and that
the settlement with them precluded this action against it. The court
rejected this contention, and held that the two infringements complained of were different "transactions," and that the defendant here
had neither knowledge of nor participated in the earlier infringement.
In essence, the court seemed to say that because of the different nature
of the infringing transactions, ther was indeed a logical basis for the
apportionment of damages and thus the infringements could not
be considered joint.
In the case of Northern Music Corp. v. King Record Distrib. Co.,92 a
similar basis for apportionment was found to exist. Plaintiff, copyright
89 See Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 413 (1937):
"An examination of the multitude of cases leads to the conclusion that 'joint tortfeasor' means radically different things to different courts, and often to the same
court .. "
90 Id. at 442.
91 254 Fed. 113 (D. Conn. 1918).
92 105 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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owner of a musical composition, joined several defendants in an action
for infringement. The defendants were charged with "infringing plaintiff's copyrighted composition by manufacturing, distributing or selling
phonograph records, or by publishing and selling sheet music, or by
licensing for radio or television broadcast the allegedly infringing composition."9 3 The court found infringement on all counts, and originally
held all the defendants jointly liable for all of the plaintiff's damages
and severally liable for their individual profits. In a supplemental
opinion, however, the court altered this disposition and rendered the
individual primary infringers jointly liable for the plaintiff's damages,
holding that the other defendants were "liable only for that portion of
the damage which is attributable to their individual infringements ...."94
This holding, it is submitted, is correct.
Once joint infringement is found, a further problem arises when all
the joint infringers are not joined in the same action. The advantages
of joinder are obvious, and the liberality of modem procedural codes
in this regard is dear. In fact, joinder is desirable even when, as in
Altman and Northern Music, all the defendants are not jointly liable.
However, as a recent infringement case put it, "it is hombook law that
an aggrieved party is not compelled to sue all tort feasors. He may sue
one or more or all of them, at hi4 discretion." 95
The copyright owner may well choose to sue but one of the joint
infringers. This was the case in Woolworth. In such cases, as has been
suggested, the plaintiff is entitled to his full damages from the party
sued. However, it is manifestly unjust to require the one defendant sued
to bear the entire brunt of the plaintiff's injury. Several states now authorize contribution among tort feasors, and, as Prosser predicts, "it seems
probable that in due course of time pressure of opinion will compel the
abolition of the rule [against contribution], at least as to all except willful
wrongdoers." 96
In the case of copyright infringement, unlike most instances in tort, it
is very likely that many of the joint infringers are in no real sense
"wrongdoers" at all. For while it is true that each has infringed a copyright, in most cases of secondary infringement he infringed without either
negligence or intent. In Woolworth, as in McCulloch, the innocence of
the infringing sellers was not questioned; still, liability resulted. The
justifications for strict liability are dear. The purpose of a Copyright Act
93

Id. at 395.

94

Id. at 402.

Robbins Music Corp. v. Alamo Music, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 29, 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
96 Prosser, supra note 89, at 429.
95
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97
is to encourage the production of original, creative works, and this
purpose would surely be substantially defeated if the protections afforded
the copyright owner were limited to willful infringement. Innocent infringement can just as seriously impair the value of the copyright. Furthermore, it seems well founded that as between two innocent partiesthe copyright owner and the innocent infringer-it is the latter who
should bear the loss sustained.
This does not mean, however, that the loss should remain with the
98
innocent infringer. As has been indicated, in most cases the secondary
infringer has no effective means of determining whether or not the work
he prints, distributes, or sells, is, in fact, an infringement. In many areas,
such secondary parties are protected by indemnity agreements, or "save
harmless" clauses, 99 but such protections may not be so common in others.
Thus, there would seem good reason, when the innocent secondary
infringer is the party sued, to give him an "action over" against any preceding non-innocent infringer. And since copyright is a congressionally
created right, and thus infringement a congressionally created wrong, it
would seem desirable that such an "action over" be established by
statute.100 If such an action were available, the plaintiff would be assured
a just recovery, and ultimately the burden of the loss would be placed
where it belongs.

CONCLUSION

Although a completely satisfactory resolution of the difficulties posed
by the language of section 101(b) can only be achieved through a general
revision of the Copyright Act, there are several areas in which the courts
97 The constitutional authorization of copyright and patent legislation comes from
To promote the Progress of Science
art. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have power ...
and Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
98 See text accompanying note 78 supra.
09 See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963);
F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 193 F.2d 162 (Ist Cir. 1951), aff'd,
344 U.S. 228 (1953); Harms, Inc. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 163 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. Cal.
1959); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1949),
aff'd, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951). In certain cases it is conceivable that the implied
warranties of merchantability provided in U.S.A. § 15(2) and U.C.C. § 2-314 would
give the secondary infringer an action over against the primary infringer, cf. Manning
Mfg. Co. v. Hartol Prods. Corp., 99 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1938); Brown, The Operation of
the Damage Provisions of the Copyright Law: An Exploratory Study, in Revision,
Study No. 23, at 87 (1958).
100 In Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publications, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y.
1939), an approach analogous to an "action over" was invoked. There, the plaintiff
joined the publisher and distributors of infringing comic books. The court, recognizing the latter's innocence, declared them only secondarily liable for the plaintiff's
damages. Thus, the innocent distributors would be liable only if the primary infringer
were insolvent.
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can rectify existing confusion and inconsistency. Application of the common law joint tort concept to infringement actions, for example, could
prevent the possibility of multiple recoveries for the same injury. For
although the statute can certainly be read to render each infringer severally liable, reference to the prevailing case law, and the general nature
and purposes of the act,1' 1 indicates that such a reading should be rejected. Since the purpose of the damage provisions is to assure the copyright owner full protection in the enjoyment of his statutory rights, and
to provide him with compensation for injuries sustained as a result of
infringement, the courts in cases like McCulloch and Goody could reasonably decide that once the plaintiff has been compensated for his loss,
there is no statutory command for any further recovery. By so deciding,
the courts could prevent potential abuse of the remedy provisions by
copyright owners and yet assure them full recovery for whatever damages
they may have sustained. Any statutory revision, of course, should make
such reasoning imperative.
In interpreting the specific provisions of section 101(b), the courts can
certainly resolve the present confusion concerning the award of damages
and/or profits. Although there is respectable authority to justify either
the cumulative or the alternative award, the "unjust enrichment" rationale, as well as the possibility of duplicate awards for the same infringing sale, clearly suggest that the alternative interpretation is to be
preferred. By treating the plaintiff's damages as an element of the infringer's deductible costs, the courts could remain consistent with the
language of the statute, its legislative history, and the only justification
provided for the award of profits. But, again, any revised act should make
this interpretation explicit.
Furthermore, in rendering awards of infringer's profits to copyright
owners, the courts could avoid the anomaly suggested by the Capitol
Theater case by enlarging current conceptions of deductible costs to
include the opportunity costs of the infringer. Since it is reasonable to
assume that an innocent secondary infringer would not have handled the
infringing items had he known they were infringements, and that he
would have obtained non-infringing items instead, there appears to be
no valid objection to allowing him to deduct from the profits he made
from the infringing items the profits he would likely have made had he
not infringed. Moreover, since awards of profits as they are currently
made may often serve to reward the copyright owner for the efficiency
101 See Berlin v. E. C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543 (1964): "In the words of
Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, copyright protection is designed 'To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts,' and the financial reward guaranteed to the
copyright holder is but an incident of this general objective, rather than an end
in itself."
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and good will of the infringer (the propriety of which is certainly questionable), adoption of the proposed analysis would ensure that the copyright owner only be awarded those profits to which he is equitably
entitled. Since in the case of innocent secondary infringers such profits
are likely to be negligible, it appears desirable that a revised act provide
that no award of profits be made against such infringers.
Although some courts have withheld awards of statutory damages
against innocent infringers in certain cases, the great weight of authority
has interpreted the "in lieu" clause to require an award of at least the
statutory minimum against all infringers. But even without the difficulties created by joint infringements, in many cases such awards seem
wholly unjustified. Since an innocent infringer, by definition, cannot be
deterred, in the absence of actual injury to the copyright owner the only
function such an award has is to penalize the infringer and provide a
windfall to the plaintiff. And although the courts could, and perhaps
should, read into the statute an exception for such cases, it seems likely
that this anomaly will have to be rectified by statutory revision. However,
in awarding more than the statutory minimum, the courts could certainly
require that the plaintiff first establish that he has in fact been injured
by the infringement and that proof of the amount of such injury is difficult or impossible. In this way the possibility of undeserved awards of
statutory damages would be minimized, but without any substantial
change in the plaintiff's right to a meaningful recovery.
Finally, to prevent the possibility of an innocent secondary infringer
being burdened with the entire brunt of the plaintiff's damages, a revised
act should provide for an action over by such infringers against preceding
non-innocent infringers. For although any Copyright Act should be
primarily concerned with protecting the copyright owner, there is no
reason why the innocent infringer should not be protected as well. The
action over, as well as the other proposals here made, are desirable steps
in the achievement of these ends.

